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Abstract 
 
Knowledge is recognised as an important source of competitive advantage and hence there 
has been increasing academic and practitioner interest in understanding and isolating the 
factors that contribute to effective knowledge transfer between supply chain actors. The 
literature identifies power as a salient contributor to the effective operation of a supply chain 
partnership. However, there is a paucity of empirical research examining how power among 
actors influences knowledge acquisition and in turn the performance of supply chain partners. 
The aim of this research is to address this gap by examining the relationship between power, 
knowledge acquisition and supply chain performance among the supply chain partners of a 
focal Chinese steel manufacturer. A structured survey was used to collect the necessary data. 
Two conceptually independent variables – ‘availability of alternatives’ and ‘restraint in the use 
of power’ – were used to assess actual and realised power respectively. Controlling for 
contingencies, we found that the flow of knowledge increased when supply chain actors had 
limited alternatives and when the more powerful actor exercised restraint in the use of power. 
Moreover, we found a positive relationship between knowledge acquisition and supply chain 
performance. This paper enriches the literature by empirically extending our understanding of 
how power affects knowledge acquisition and performance. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines the relationship between power and knowledge transfer among supply 
chain partners because this is an important relationship and research in this area is scarce. 
Supply chain partnership is one of the most widely adopted forms of collaborative interfirm 
alliance (Pekar and Allio, 1994). This is largely due to features that afford flexibility within 
the relationship such as contractual agreements between partners (if one exists at all) that are 
unlikely to possess the rigidity and legal agreements of the contracts prevalent in other forms 
of interfirm relationship, for example joint ventures, R&D partnerships and cross licencing  
(e.g. Wilson, 1995; Frankel et al., 1996; Lambert et al., 1996). 
A number of theories are used to explain the rationale for entering into collaborative 
agreements. These include transaction cost economics (TCE) (Williamson, 1975), the 
resource-based view (RBV) (Barney, 1991), resource dependence theory (RDT) (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978), and the relational view (Dyer and Singh, 1998). According to TCE firms 
enter into collaborative agreements in order to reduce the cost of participating in the market.  
Here, collaborative agreements unlike merger and acquisition offer a restricted hierarchy 
because of partial absorption of interdependencies (Fitzroy et al., 2011). The RBV posits that 
firms enter into collaborative agreements to complement their resources (Murray et al., 2005). 
According to RDT organisations are constrained and affected by their environments and 
attempt to manage resources dependencies by pursuing from amongst five options one of 
which is interorganisational collaboration (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). As such, RDT posits 
that firms use collaborative arrangements to reduce uncertainty and interdependence 
(Harrigan and Newman, 1990). The relational view postulates that idiosyncratic interfirm 
linkages are a source of superior rent. Dyer and Singh (1998) identify four sources of 
relational rents: (a) relation-specific assets; (b) knowledge sharing routines; (c) 
complementary resources / capabilities; and (d) effective governance. The unit of analysis in 
the case of the relational view is networks and/or dyads of firms, while the firm is the unit of 
analysis in the case of the other three theories. There are two important points to note. First, 
RBV, the relational view, and RDT are complementary. For example, the RBV posits that 
inter-organisation collaboration facilitates the development of valuable resources, while the 
relational view argues that shared resources and routines are a source of competitive 
advantage. In essence RBV describes how/why, and the relational view describes what/why.  
Second, as we discuss later, RDT is the only theory that implicitly recognises the significance 
of power. 
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The knowledge based view (KBV) uses the logic of RBV to posit that “knowledge” is a major 
determinant of competiveness (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Grant, 1996). Moreover, scholars 
postulate that knowledge sharing between alliance partners is a major contributor to enhanced 
competitiveness (Levinson and Asahi, 1995; Mowery et al., 1996; Inkpen, 1998). Not 
surprisingly, knowledge management practices among supply chain partners have attracted 
much attention (e.g. Beecham and Cordey-Hayes, 1998; Kotabe et al., 2003; Hult et al., 2004; 
Handfield and Lawson, 2007; Modi and Mabert, 2007; Rauniar et al., 2008; Pedroso and 
Nakano, 2009). The literature suggests that partnerships between buyer and supplier firms are 
a conduit for knowledge sharing that can result in improved performance along the entire 
supply chain (Heide and Miner, 1992; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Krause et al., 2007; Rauniar 
et al., 2008; Lawson et al., 2009; Cao and Zhang, 2010). 
One strand of empirical research on supply chain partnerships has focused on isolating and 
examining the impact of key attributes of partnership (most commonly trust, commitment, 
interdependence and shared meaning) on the exchange of knowledge between supply chain 
partners (e.g. Spekman et al., 2002; Hult et al., 2004; Dyer and Hatch, 2006; Krause et al., 
2007; Modi and Mabert, 2007; Panayides and Venus Lun, 2009). According to the extant 
literature, power among supply chain partners is another key attribute influencing the 
operational behaviour and performance of supply chain partners (Lascelles and Dale, 1989; 
New, 1998; Cox, 1999; Cox et al., 2001; Hallikas et al., 2005; Ke et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2010). 
The relative power of partners is likely to significantly influence the distribution of 
responsibilities and the flow of benefits between them (Benton and Maloni, 2005; Hingley, 
2005; Zhao et al., 2008; Ke et al., 2009; Esmaeili and Zeephongsekul, 2010). 
The importance of power goes beyond academic curiosity. According to Cox (1999), 
cognisance of power is of significant importance to practitioners as well as academics. He 
argued that if they fail to understand power within the supply chain, both practitioners and 
academics ‘may well be guilty of recommending strategies and operational practices that are 
inappropriate for the supply chains in which they operate’ (Cox, 1999, p. 172). Maloni and 
Benton (2000) echoed this view and suggested that supply chain practice or research that does 
not account for the influence of power cannot be entirely realistic or implementable. 
Research examining the relationship between power and different attributes of supply chain 
partnership is relatively sparse and generally suffers from methodological shortcomings. As 
far as we were able to ascertain, the majority of publications that do exist are either 
conceptual (e.g. Cox, 1999; Watson, 1999; Cox et al., 2001; Li et al., 2002; Cox, 2004; Sucky, 
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2006; Crook and Combs, 2007; Muthusamy et al., 2008), or descriptive (e.g. Ogbonna and 
Wilkinson, 1998; Ireland, 1999; Watson, 2001). The lack of empirical research is potentially 
detrimental to the scholarly development of the field and to practice. Moreover, the limited 
number of empirical studies we were able to locate also displayed methodological limitations. 
The majority were case based, hence limiting the opportunity to develop generalisable 
conclusions (e.g. Bates and Slack, 1998; Sanderson, 2001; Cousins, 2002; Faria and Wensley, 
2002; Hingley, 2005; Krajewski et al., 2005; Narasimhan et al., 2009). The few published 
studies using survey methodology lacked clarity on validity and reliability issues (e.g. Provan 
and Gassenheimer, 1994; Yeung et al., 2009). Furthermore, the previous quantitative studies 
we located that dealt with multiple dependent variables (e.g. Provan and Gassenheimer, 1994; 
Berthon et al., 2003; Caniels and Gelderman, 2007) generally used analytical methods such as 
multiple regression, rather than techniques such as canonical correlation, MANOVA, 
MANCOVA and SEM (structural equation modelling) as recommended by Podsakoff and 
Dalton (1987), which can simultaneously handle multiple dependent variables, and account 
for systematic variances of dependent variables and potential interrelationships between 
dependent variables. There are a small number of exceptions (e.g. Zhao et al., 2008; Ke et al., 
2009). For example, Zhao et al. (2008) examined the impact of power and relationship 
commitment on supply chain integration using SEM. Ke et al. (2009) examined the impact of 
mediated and non-mediated power on electronic supply chain management system adoption, 
following a partial least squares technique. However, the foci of these two studies are 
significantly different from the focus of the present study. 
Turning our attention to research specifically concerned with the relationship between power 
and knowledge sharing among supply chain partners, additional shortcomings are evident. 
First, despite its apparent importance (Beecham and Cordey-Hayes, 1998; Dyer and Nobeoka, 
2000; Ke and Wei, 2007; Muthusamy et al., 2008; Ke et al., 2009) there is a dearth of 
empirical studies examining this relationship. It is a specific field of study that requires 
greater attention. Second, there is a divergence of views about the impact of power. Some 
authors argue that power is detrimental (Beecham and Cordey-Hayes, 1998; Maloni and 
Benton, 2000; Muthusamy et al., 2008), while others argue that power is helpful (Cox, 1999; 
Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Yeung et al., 2009). This lack of consistency, which we return to in 
the next section, provides a further impetus for this study. 
Despite the existence of numerous literature contributions examining relationship factors such 
as trust, commitment, interdependence and shared meaning, the literature suggests that there 
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is a lack of empirical research examining power in supply chain partnerships (see also Caniels 
and Gelderman, 2007), and especially its influence on interfirm knowledge transfer. Given 
that power tends to be a complex factor influencing the dynamics of supply chain partnership, 
we argue that it is critically important to give power due consideration in its own right 
through empirical study. For example, if we find that the restraint of power enhances 
knowledge acquisition, then management behaviour that seeks to take advantage of actual 
power purely for self-interest is likely in the long term to be detrimental to improving 
performance, and such behaviour needs to be re-evaluated. This paper therefore contributes to 
the extant literature by examining the relationship between power and knowledge transfer 
among supply chain partners. Furthermore, we extend the understanding by examining the 
effect on supply chain performance. If we find that knowledge acquisition enhances overall 
supply chain performance then boundary-spanning employees and managers should be 
empowered and equipped better to lead knowledge acquisition efforts, and supply chain 
partners should be encouraged to identify and develop the context-specific practices that will 
provide the necessary, sustainable communication and collaboration platforms. We use two 
constructs rooted in appropriate theory – ‘availability of alternatives’ and ‘restraint in the use 
of power’ – to assess power, and we also examine their interactional effect. We controlled for 
the effects of partnership duration in our model. As a further methodological extension, we 
controlled for contingencies present in previous studies that used a cross-section of 
independent firms, by focusing on actors operating within the supply chain of a single focal 
firm. 
2. Literature 
In this section we start by examining the concept of power and review how power might 
influence the behaviour of supply chain partners. This is followed by a discussion of the two 
indicators of power among supply chain partners. We then discuss knowledge acquisition 
which underpins any interfirm knowledge transfer process. 
2.1. Power and supply chain partnerships 
The study of power and its consequences has its roots in social and political sciences. More 
recently power has been used by scholars to study the behaviour of marketing channels and 
supply chain relationships (e.g. Ramsay, 1996; Maloni and Benton, 2000; Cox et al., 2001). 
Power is defined as the ability of one party (A) to get another party (B) to undertake an 
activity that B would not otherwise undertake (Cox et al., 2001). The literature distinguishes 
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between ‘possessed power’ and ‘realised power’. ‘Realised power’ is the outcome of 
exercising ‘possessed power’ to bring about intended changes in the behaviour of the 
counterpart. According to Muthusamy and White (2006) power is either balanced or 
unbalanced. Balanced power exists where partnership actors possess broadly similar levels of 
power in influencing each other’s decisions, while unbalanced power exists when one or more 
actors are able to manipulate decisions of the other actors (Muthusamy and White, 2006). 
RDT characterises the firm as an open system, dependent on contingencies in the external 
environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The theory attempts to address two key questions.  
First, where power and dependence come from ? Second, how managers use organisation’s 
power and manage their dependence ?  It posits that managers can and do act to reduce 
environmental uncertainty and dependence (Hillman et al., 2009).  Central to this action is the 
concept of power - control over vital resources (Ulrich and Barney, 1984). According to 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) firms engage in interorganisational relationships to minimise 
uncertainties and dependencies. According to RDT if firm A, supplying intermediate goods, 
supplies only one major customer (firm B), then firm A is dependent on firm B, but if A 
supplies many firms and amongst these is firm B, then the two firms are mutually dependent 
on one another. To ensure consistency with RDT, through the rest of this paper we use 
“mutual dependence” to signify “balanced power” and “dependence” to signify “asymmetric 
power”. Furthermore, as will become clear, our measure of power is rooted in dependence. 
A number of scholars argue that in practice, mutual dependence among supply chain actors is 
a rarity due to differences in size, business resources, availability of alternatives and 
reputation (Ramsay, 1996). Moreover, New (1998, p.18) argued that ‘even amongst firms who 
wished to work collaboratively, there seemed little chance of abandoning the sanctions and 
mechanism of the market’. This suggests that irrespective of intentions, power considerations 
play a role in every type of supply chain. The existence of two archetypal buyer–supplier 
relationships – ‘strong buyer–weak supplier’ and ‘weak buyer–strong supplier’ was illustrated 
by Bates and Slack (1998). However, the relationship between exchange partners is dynamic 
and may shift between partners from one transaction to another (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
The literature is divided on how dependence influences purchaser–supplier relationships with 
some scholars pointing to a positive and others to a negative consequence. In his conceptual 
paper, McDonald (1999) argued that dependence of one party on another  in the case of 
buyers and suppliers is likely to result in unproductive partnerships. This is a view shared by 
industry commentators. For example, the Competition Commission concluded that ‘the 
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transfer of excessive risk and unexpected costs by grocery retailers to their suppliers through 
various supply chain practices, if unchecked, will have an adverse effect on investment and 
innovation in the supply chain, and ultimately on consumers’ (Competition Commission, 2008, 
p. 6). A number of empirical studies also support this proposition (Heide and Miner, 1992; 
Beecham and Cordey-Hayes, 1998; Maloni and Benton, 2000). Maloni and Benton (2000) 
argued that dependence has the potential to upset the mutuality of relationships, and therefore 
acts as a barrier to win–win integration. That is, that in an unbalanced relationship the 
dependency may not be reciprocal, such that one partner has power over the other but not vice 
versa (Wilson, 1995). Under such circumstances, exploitation rather than cooperation might 
result (Heide and Miner, 1992). 
Other scholars argue that dependency may result in favourable consequences. For example, 
Lascelles and Dale (1989) suggested that buyers’ purchasing power often contributes to 
successful quality improvement of the supplier. Cox (1999) makes a similar point, 
highlighting that Toyota used its suppliers’ dependency  to force them to adopt innovations 
such as an assembly based, demand-pull and just-in-time (JIT) system. Yeung et al’s (2009) 
study concluded that coercive power improves supplier integration in Chinese supply chains, 
with or without the presence of trust. He argued that the exercise of power can potentially 
assure congruence in goals and activities, particularly in the absence of a well specified 
cooperation agreement. Each of these studies supports the view dependency may result in 
beneficial effects. 
In addition to the disagreement present in the literature, there is a paucity of empirical 
research specifically examining the influence of power on the transfer of knowledge between 
supply chain partners.  
2.2. Indicators of power  
Unlike other attributes of supply chain partnerships, power cannot be readily measured (New, 
1998). This is because power is an amalgam of complex social, economic and even 
psychological factors. It is a subjective phenomenon predicated on one’s belief or expectation 
of how another actor will create an impact on oneself (Cho and Chu, 1994). Cox (1999) notes 
that when examining the power relationship between purchasers and suppliers operating 
within the same supply chain, it is the relative rather than the absolute power that is of interest. 
In this research we were interested in ascertaining the impact of power among the supply 
chain actors of a focal firm on the transfer of knowledge between them, rather than measuring 
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the absolute power of each actor, which presents significant challenges. 
The literature identifies two main indicators of power among actors within a focal firm’s 
supply chain – ‘availability of alternatives’ and ‘restraint in the use of power’ (e.g. Hardwick 
and Ford, 1986; Ganesan, 1994; Kim et al., 2004; Crook and Combs, 2007). Power-
dependence theory posits that inequalities in dependence create power imbalances that can 
lead to conflict in social exchange (Emerson, 1962). Although both actors could be mutually 
dependent in an exchange, it does not mean that they are equally dependent on each other 
(Kim et al., 2004). The less dependent actor will maintain a power advantage, resulting in a 
power imbalance. According to both marketing channel theory (e.g. Ganesan, 1994) and 
bargaining theory (e.g. Yan and Gray, 1994), an important source of dependence is a lack of 
alternatives. This accords with Hardwick and Ford’s (1986) proposition that dependence, at 
whatever level, represents a poor option since it derives from a lack of choice. Although a 
supply chain partnership is formed on the basis of vertical complementarities (Christopher, 
1998), which result in a certain level of mutual dependence, the lack of alternatives for one 
party will still limit the extent of equal say in the partnership (Anderson and Weitz, 1989). 
Building on this point, Crook and Combs (2007) suggest that members of a collaborative 
supply chain who furnish important resources or resources where control is concentrated, 
enjoy superior bargaining power. That is to say, a lack of alternatives increases dependency 
and reduces opportunity for independent behaviour. Conversely, a supply chain actor with 
alternatives is more likely to exploit those actors with fewer options (Anderson and Narus, 
1990; Ganesan, 1994).  
The second factor explaining power, ‘restraint in the use of power’, affects ‘realised’ power. It 
is highly probable that in a supply chain one party may be dependent on another due to 
differences in availability of alternatives (Ramsay, 1996; New, 1998; Cox, 1999). However, 
dependency may be neutralised if those with power exercise restraint in its exploitive use 
(Muthusamy and White, 2006). Consideration of long-term interests and future gains may 
encourage firms to adopt a policy predicated on the restricted use of power (Heide and Miner, 
1992; Muthusamy and White, 2005), or power may, in fact, be used to positively influence a 
less powerful actor (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000). Maloni and Benton’s (2000) study showed 
that some automobile manufacturers with objective power chose to follow a cooperative 
approach, encouraging communication and sharing of benefits; while others opted for a 
competitive approach, exercising their leverage over weaker supply chain partners. In 
particular, however, Maloni and Benton (2000) observed that if a boundary-spanning manager 
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is willing to restrain the excessive use of power over their partner and at the same time allow 
the partner to have a say, then each partner is more likely to have positive feelings or 
psychological attachment to the relationship due to a better balance in realised power. 
The preceding arguments illustrate that availability of alternatives determines dependency 
among supply chain partners, while policy towards the deployment of power determines the 
realised power, and that together, these two variables determine the level of dependency 
among supply chain actors of a focal firm. 
2.3. Knowledge acquisition 
Knowledge acquisition is the process of accessing and absorbing knowledge through direct or 
indirect contact or interaction with knowledge sources (e.g. Inkpen and Dinur, 1998; Albino et 
al., 1999; Hult et al., 2004). KBV  posits that the relative ability to acquire and develop 
knowledge is the key reason for variances in organisational performance (Grant, 1996). 
Accordingly knowledge acquisition capability is an essential contributor to the enhanced 
operation of supply chain partners. Typical knowledge acquisition mechanisms in supply 
chains include joint problem solving, ongoing manual adjustment (Love and Gunasekaran, 
1999; Kotabe et al., 2003), supplier co-design (Beecham and Cordey-Hayes, 1998; Handfield 
et al., 1999) and co-location (Cousins et al., 2008). In the next section we discuss the 
influence of power on knowledge acquisition. 
3. Research hypotheses 
In this section we develop our hypotheses. In this research we deploy two conceptually 
distinct constructs to assess power: actual power and realised power. Figure 1 illustrates the 
hypothesised relationships between the study variables, namely availability of alternatives, 
restraint in the use of power, knowledge acquisition and supply chain performance, as well as 
between our two predictor variables. 
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Figure 1. Framework of relationships between the indicators of power, knowledge acquisition 
and supply chain performance. 
 
3.1. The influence of power on knowledge acquisition 
The measure of actual power in this study is the availability of alternative partners, that is to 
say, the greater the number of potential alternatives the firm has, the less dependent the firm is 
and hence the more powerful it is. The extant literature suggests that actors with many 
alternative partners in a supply chain are less likely to become dependent on a partnership, 
and that these stronger actors might be tempted to exploit their power (Caniels and Gelderman, 
2007). Moreover, a partner with many alternatives is more likely to restrict the out-flow of 
knowledge to protect its core proprietary assets or market position, although at the same time 
it is acknowledged that it may be more able to coerce knowledge out of the dependent 
partners (Albino et al., 1999). It has been noted, nevertheless, that stronger partners’ lack of 
recognition for weaker partners can result in missed opportunities because valuable 
knowledge possessed by the weaker party is ignored (Beecham and Cordey-Hayes, 1998). 
Others argue that weaker partners with fewer alternatives are also likely to limit exposing 
valuable knowledge to stronger partners to avoid exploitation and to reduce the likelihood of 
obsolescence (Anderson and Weitz, 1989; Provan and Skinner, 1989). Anderson and Weitz 
(1989) note that there is ample evidence that the weaker party becomes mistrustful and 
apprehensive about the stronger party’s intentions. The weaker partner consequently may 
even engage in a pre-emptive strike against the more powerful partner to protect its 
knowledge assets (Kumar et al., 1995). The evidence suggests that availability of alternatives 
is likely to discourage actors operating within a focal supply chain from being open with each 
other and sharing knowledge, as fear of exploitation and obsolescence are likely to be higher. 
Therefore, 
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Hypothesis 1: The availability of alternatives to partners is negatively related to the level 
of knowledge acquisition between a firm and its supply chain partners. 
The measure of realised power in this study is the voluntary restraint in the use of power or its 
constructive deployment. As discussed in section 2, firms’ policies towards the use of power 
and the manner in which power is used has been shown to influence communication and 
information sharing (Maloni and Benton, 2000). Moreover, the evidence suggests that 
different levels of intention to exercise power may contribute to different levels of knowledge 
sharing and partnering from ‘uninvolved’ to ‘integrated’ (Beecham and Cordey-Hayes, 1998). 
For example, technology partnering involves extensive exchange of knowledge. This line of 
reasoning has a direct resonance for our study. Commitment to a relationship is enhanced 
when partners in less powerful positions observe and experience the willingness of a more 
powerful partner not to exercise that power for self-interest, but rather to restrain excessive 
use of that power in the interests of long-term gains (Muthusamy and White, 2005). The 
positive impressions generate positive reactions, opening up communication channels and 
engendering genuine desires to work more closely for mutual benefit. This enhanced 
communication and cooperation provides the platform for knowledge exchange. The 
arguments proffered suggest that restraint in the use of power will enhance knowledge sharing 
between supply chain partners. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 2: The restraint in the use of power in a relationship is positively related to the 
level of knowledge acquisition between a firm and its supply chain partners. 
3.2. The relationship between the two indicators of power 
The indicators of power in this study are availability of alternatives and restraint in the use of 
power. Their relationship needs to be examined. The literature indicates that the two 
indicators of power are associated. Both resource-dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978) and power-dependence theory (Emerson, 1962) suggests that power can be viewed in 
terms of dependency. Dependence will increase when fewer alternative sources of exchange 
are available to the focal firm, or when replacing or substituting a current exchange partner is 
difficult (Heide and John, 1988). Waheed and Gaur (2012) built on the power-dependence 
theory and posited that the dependence of one party on a source is directly related to the 
rewards obtained from that source and inversely related to the number of alternative sources 
of those rewards. Thus the availability of alternatives to one party in a relationship reduces its 
dependency and often contributes to its power over the other (Anderson and Weitz, 1989). 
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Especially in circumstances where one party possesses substantial leverage over the other, the 
stronger party will often exploit the dependence of its partner and create terms of trade in 
favour of itself (Heide and John, 1988; Anderson and Weitz, 1989). In the absence of moral or 
altruistic reasons, policy/belief, or the absence of tight contractual agreements as is 
particularly the case with supply chain partnerships, there is little incentive for a stronger 
partner with many alternatives to exercise restraint in the use of that power. In such 
circumstances, it is more likely to use that power in order to strengthen its competitive 
position (Ganesan, 1994). These arguments imply that restraint in the use of power is less 
likely to exist in situations when there is an availability of alternatives. Similarly, resource 
dependency theory (Caniels and Gelderman, 2007) supports the proposition that in 
circumstances where restraint in the use of power is observed to be exercised, it is likely to be 
a situation where there are less alternatives available, in other words, a situation where there is 
reason for restraint to be exercised (Muthusamy and White, 2006). These two situations 
equate to an inverse (or negative) correlation between the two indicators of power. Therefore,  
Hypothesis 3: The availability of alternatives to actors in a supply chain partnership is 
negatively correlated with restraint in the use of power by more powerful actors. 
3.3. Knowledge acquisition and performance improvement 
The suggestion that acquisition of external knowledge enhances the performance of firms 
operating within a supply chain enjoys broad support (Wu and Hsu, 2001; Kotabe et al., 2003; 
Modi and Mabert, 2007; Rauniar et al., 2008; Yeung et al., 2008; Lawson et al., 2009). 
According to Dyer and Nobeoka (2000) and Ethiraj et al. (2005) the process of knowledge 
acquisition has a positive impact on a firm’s capability. They noted that the process generates 
‘dynamic learning capabilities’ and ‘client-specific capabilities’ respectively. Similarly, the 
quantity and variety of knowledge acquired by a firm has been found to enhance its 
innovativeness, eventually improving its performance (Wu and Hsu, 2001). Kotabe et al.’s 
(2003) study showed that sharing of technical know-how improved suppliers’ performance. 
Similarly, it has been shown that undertaking knowledge transfer activities helps a firm create 
value for itself in the form of improved supplier performance (Modi and Mabert, 2007). Key 
attributes of customer knowledge that when shared have a significant impact on operational 
performance of the focal firm have also been identified (Yeung et al., 2008). Thus the thrust in 
the literature suggests that knowledge acquisition has a positive impact on performance. 
Therefore, 
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Hypothesis 4: The level of knowledge acquisition from its supply chain partners is 
positively related to the supply chain performance of a focal firm. 
4. Research method 
To test the hypotheses, our research design was informed by Hult et al. (2002) and Hallikas et 
al. (2005). We used the supply chain of a single focal firm as our sampling frame. Examining 
the supply chain of a single focal firm is inherently fine grained because it avoids the 
confounding effects of studying a collection of firms operating within different supply chains 
(Hult et al., 2004). This is because management practices, power and sectoral contingencies 
vary from supply chain to supply chain. Therefore, our primary data were collected from the 
supply network of a large Chinese steel producer using a structured survey instrument. 
The choice of industry is also important and the steel industry offers a number of advantages. 
First, the steel industry’s supply chain represents a traditional chain with discernible explicit 
movements of raw materials and products, as well as flow of funds and information. Second, 
it is possible to accurately and readily locate upstream and downstream supplier firms, and 
hence develop a sample where both are well represented. 
Finally, this approach is likely to yield a much higher response rate compared with the cold 
calling approach. Once the participation of the focal firm is secured, the assistance or 
sponsorship from the focal firm to secure access to other firms within its network may 
legitimise the survey and encourage greater response. 
4.1. Instrument design and administration 
We followed Dillman’s (2000) tailored design method for developing and administrating our 
questionnaire in order to (a) ensure a close fit between the constructs, research context and the 
target population; and (b) maximise the response rate. To enhance validity and reliability, we 
adopted predictor variables from previous studies, provided that they were suitable for our 
target sample and congruent with our aims. To identify the appropriate measures of 
availability of alternatives and restraint in the use of power, we compared the relevant items 
from Anderson and Weitz (1992), Heide and Miner (1992), Ganesan (1994), Maloni and 
Benton (2000) and Muthusamy and White (2006). The items for availability of alternatives 
from (Ganesan, 1994) and the items for restraint in the use of power from (Heide and Miner, 
1992) were found to be the most suitable. These items have been widely acknowledged and 
adopted by previous researchers as measures of power in inter-organisational research (e.g. 
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Kemp and Ghauri, 2001; Storer et al., 2005; Waheed and Gaur, 2012). Similarly, we compared 
the measures of knowledge acquisition from Kotabe et al. (2003), Hult et al. (2004) and 
Ramasamy et al. (2006), and found Hult et al’s (2004) items to be the most appropriate. Table 
1 presents the items adopted. The predictor variables (availability of alternatives, restraint in 
the use of power, and knowledge acquisition) were measured using a 7-point Likert-type scale, 
where 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree. 
Table 1. Measures of predictor variables. 
Item label Original measures Adopted measures 
Availability of alternatives: original measures adapted from (Ganesan, 1994) 
ALTRN1 If our relationship were discontinued with this 
resource, we would have difficulty in making up the 
sales volume in our trading area 
If our relationship were discontinued with this 
partner, we would have difficulty in making up the 
sales volume in our trading area 
ALTRN2 This resource is crucial to our future performance This partner is crucial to our future performance 
ALTRN3 It would be difficult for us to replace this resource It would be difficult for us to replace this partner 
ALTRN4 We are dependent on this resource We are dependent on this partner 
ALTRN5 We do not have a good alternative to this resource We do not have a good alternative to this partner 
ALTRN6 This resource is important to our business This partner is important to our business 
Restraint in the use of power: original measures adapted from (Heide and Miner, 1992) 
RSTPW1 The parties feel it is important not to use any 
proprietary information to the other party’s 
advantage [sic] 
Both parties feel it is important not to use any 
proprietary information to the other party’s 
disadvantage 
RSTPW2 A characteristic of the relationship is that neither 
party is expected to make demands that might be 
damaging to the other 
A characteristic of the relationship is that neither 
party is expected to make demands that might be 
damaging to the other 
RSTPW3 The parties expect the more powerful party to 
restrain the use of his power in attempting to get his 
way 
Both parties expect the more powerful party to 
restrain the use of its power in attempting to get its 
way 
Knowledge acquisition: original measures adapted from (Hult et al., 2004) 
KNACQ1 We meet regularly to find out what products we 
need in the future 
Our firm and this partner meet regularly to find out 
what products we need in the future 
KNACQ2 We do a lot of in-house research on products we 
may need 
Our firm and the partner do a lot of in-house 
research on products we may need 
KNACQ3 We poll participants once a year to assess the 
quality of our supply chain services 
Our firm and this partner poll participants regularly 
to assess the quality of our supply chain services 
KNACQ4 We periodically review the likely effect of changes 
in the supply chain environment 
Our firm and this partner periodically review the 
likely effect of changes in the supply chain 
environment 
KNACQ5 Formal routines exist to uncover faulty assumptions 
about the supply chain 
Formal routines between our firm and this supply 
chain partner exist to uncover faulty assumptions 
about the supply chain 
 
For supply chain performance we adopted the framework proposed by Gunasekaran et al. 
(2001) because of its comprehensiveness. The literature examining specific facets of supply 
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chain performance affected by knowledge transfer is underdeveloped, and hence we did not 
have a strong justification for including or excluding any of the 35 measures proposed by 
Gunasekaran et al. (2001) a priori. On the other hand, from a practical point of view we 
needed to include only measures of performance relevant to the supply chain under 
consideration. To this end we conducted four in-depth interviews with the appropriate senior 
managers of the focal firm and two field experts and consequently we eliminated 21 of the 
measures because of their poor fit with the needs of the focal firm and its supply chain 
partners, and retained 14 measures deemed most relevant (see Table 2). 
Table 2. Measures of supply chain performance. 
Areas of operation Performance measures 
Plan (3 items) Total cycle time 
 Order lead time 
 Information carrying cost 
Source (2 items) Achievement of defect free delivery 
 Purchase order cycle time 
Production (3 items) Production cycle time 
 Extent of quality cooperation 
 Capacity utilisation 
Delivery (3 items) Delivery lead time 
 Delivery reliability 
 Responsiveness to urgent delivery 
Customer service (3 items) Customer query time 
 Flexibility to meet particular needs 
 Overall customer service 
Note: 14 items of supply chain performance adapted from (Gunasekaran et al., 2001). 
 
Following the approach of previous researchers (Murray et al., 1995; Wu and Cavusgil, 2006), 
a relative-term scale was used. Respondents were asked to rate their performance relative to 
their major competitors for each performance indicator along a 7-point Likert-type scale, 
where 1 = far below, 7 = far above. Each performance indicator represents a single aspect of 
supply chain performance but arguably together they provide a holistic picture of firms’ 
process related performance. Moreover, as suggested by Murray et al. (1995), under the 
assumption of linearity, summated measure cancels out the random error of individual items, 
and better reflects the underlying construct. Therefore, the performance indicators were 
summed together into a single response variable (labelled SCPERFRM) to measure the 
overall supply chain performance of the responding firms. 
To assure face and content validity, ten pilot interviews were conducted with expert 
academics and practising managers in the UK and China. The aim was to ascertain relevance, 
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significance, comprehensiveness and clarity. Since the final questionnaire was in Chinese, a 
translation–back-translation process was undertaken to ensure consistency in meanings 
(Maxwell, 1996; Kim and Lim, 1999). 
In preparing for the fieldwork, it became apparent that not all of the suppliers and purchasers 
could be considered as partners. As such it proved difficult to construct a consistent and stable 
sampling frame preventing the use of traditional probability sampling (Robson, 1993). Instead, 
the snowball sampling procedure was used to identify the steel producer’s supply chain 
partners. This is considered to be more effective when there is difficulty in identifying a stable 
sampling frame (Robson, 2002). Subsidiaries of the focal firm and its first-tier upstream and 
downstream supply chain partners were identified. Contacts from the first-tier partners were 
used to identify second-tier partners. Screening questions helped to identify the location (i.e. 
upstream or downstream of the firms) of respondents in the supply network of the focal firm, 
and to confirm the status as a partner. 
The key informant method (Phillips, 1981) was used to select a top manager in each company 
with deep knowledge of supply chain operations. Respondents were asked to answer the 
questionnaire on the basis of the supply chain partnership with the focal firm or, in the case of 
second-tier supply chain firms, in relation to the most important or strategic partner they were 
supplying to or purchasing from within the focal firm’s supply network. This approach 
ensured that the partnerships reported on were those most likely to impact on the supply chain 
performance of the responding firm (cf. Cousins et al., 2008). 
5. Results 
5.1. Characteristics of the respondents 
We received 206 usable questionnaires from the focal firm, its subsidiaries, and upstream and 
downstream partners. 115 or slightly more than half of the responses represented downstream 
partnerships (55.8%). The majority of the responses (72.3%) or 149 responses represented 
first-tier (direct) partnerships. Overall, 54 responses are from the focal firm, remaining 
responses are either from the direct partners (95 or 46.1%) or from the indirect partners (57 or 
27.7%). 
Top, senior and operations managers represented the majority (70.9%) of the respondents 
(Table 3). The majority of these respondents were responsible for supply chain related 
operations such as procurement, production, distribution and customer services. In our case 
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the great majority of respondents possessed first-hand knowledge of the supply chain 
practices, thus increasing confidence in the outcome of the study (Joshi and Sharma, 2004). 
Table 3. Position of respondents. 
Position Frequency % 
Senior manager 77 37.4 
First line manager 49 23.8 
Operations manager 43 20.9 
CEO/chairman/managing director 26 12.6 
Administrative manager 11 5.3 
Total 206 100.0 
 
The responding firms’ sizes ranged from small to large (Table 4). The sample represented a 
wide range of businesses; however, the majority were consumers or suppliers of steel-related 
products (Table 4). 
Table 4. Size and nature of business of responding firms. 
Number of employees Frequency % 
Less than 50 employees 41 19.9 
50 to 99 employees 27 13.1 
100 to 199 employees 28 13.6 
200 to 499 employees 31 15.0 
More than 500 employees 79 38.3 
Total 206 100.0 
Sector Frequency % 
Steel processing and associated product 24 11.7 
Machinery & equipment 20 9.7 
Round steel 22 10.7 
Rare-earth associated product 13 6.3 
Marketing & distribution 11 5.3 
Steel production general 11 5.3 
Automobile & motor 9 4.4 
Industrial chemical 8 3.9 
Iron mining and extraction 8 3.9 
Accessory & component 7 3.4 
Seamless steel tube 7 3.4 
Railway lorry & motor 6 2.9 
Recycling 6 2.9 
Steel plate 6 2.9 
New material 6 2.9 
Others 42 20.4 
Total 206 100.0 
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5.2. Validity and reliability analysis 
Although all of the scales used in this study were validated by previous studies, their adoption 
did not preclude the need to further assess validity and reliability. Following the suggestions 
of Hair et al. (1998), both exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) were used to examine the reliability and validity of the survey instrument. Supply 
chain performance was represented by a single observed variable (SCPERFRM) and hence 
was not subjected to EFA and CFA. 
Exploratory factor analysis was carried out with the original scales: availability of alternatives 
(ALTRN), restraint in the use of power (RSTPW) and knowledge acquisition (KNACQ). As 
there were no theoretical reasons to assume that underlying factors should be uncorrelated, 
oblique rotation was employed (Hair et al., 1998). The rotated factor matrix (Table 5) shows 
that all the items have relative higher loadings on their corresponding factors, thus indicating 
that the three predictor variables can be explained by three separate underlying factors. 
Table 5. Rotated factor matrix of original measures. 
 Factor 
 1 2 3 
ALTRN1 0.722     
ALTRN2 0.807     
ALTRN3 0.845     
ALTRN4 0.924     
ALTRN5 0.911     
ALTRN6 0.812     
RSTPW1     0.638 
RSTPW2     0.859 
RSTPW3     0.601 
KNACQ1   0.706   
KNACQ2   0.752   
KNACQ3   0.887   
KNACQ4   0.759   
KNACQ5   0.789   
Factor with eigenvalues >1 6.616 2.347 1.375 
% of variance explained 47.260 16.762 9.824 
Notes:  
Extraction method: maximum likelihood.  
Rotation method: Oblimin with Kaiser normalisation. 
Loadings with absolute value <0.40 were suppressed. 
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To confirm the result of the EFA, CFA was carried out. Following the approach suggested by 
Hair et al. (1998) and Wallace et al. (2004), the measurement model was constructed, using 
LISREL 8.7 (Joreskog and Sorbom, 2004), with the three latent variables (ALTRN, RSTPW 
and KNACQ). 
The analysis used robust maximum likelihood (RML) as the main estimation method (Browne, 
1987). Robust maximum likelihood adjusts the normal theory of maximum likelihood chi-
square estimate for the presence of non-normality using the asymptotic covariance matrix 
provided (Boomsma and Hoogland, 2001). It therefore generates more accurate test statistics 
under conditions of non-normality (Curran et al., 1996). Robust maximum likelihood is also 
attractive because it works with sample sizes as small as 200 (Boomsma and Hoogland, 2001; 
Joreskog, 2005). Satorra and Bentler (1988) extended this method by providing a scaled chi-
square test statistic S – B χ2 as an indication of goodness of fit, which behaves extremely well 
in nearly every condition across sample size, distribution and model specification (Curran et 
al., 1996; Mels, 2004). Therefore, sample covariance matrix and the corresponding 
asymptotic covariance matrix were used with RML. 
To assess the fit of the measurement model to the data, multiple fit indices were examined 
including the χ2/df ratio, GFI (goodness-of-fit index), CFI (comparative fit index), NNFI 
(non-normed fit index), RMSEA (root mean square error of approximation) and SRMR 
(standardised root mean square residual) (Bentler and Bonnett, 1980; Kline, 1998; 
Bhattacherjee, 2002). As is shown in Table 6, the model fit indices demonstrate that the 
measurement model provides a good fit to the data. 
According to Fornell and Larcher (1981), to establish convergent validity the constructs have 
to demonstrate the following properties: (1) all factor loadings must be significant and exceed 
0.70; (2) construct reliabilities must exceed 0.70; (3) the AVE (average variance extracted) by 
each construct must exceed the variance due to measurement error for that construct (i.e. AVE 
must exceed 0.50). As shown in Tables 6 and 7, all of the conditions are met and the 
convergent validity of the instrument was deemed acceptable. Moreover, Cronbach’s alpha 
was also calculated for each construct (Table 7) and values were all above the 0.7 
recommended by Nunnally (1978). 
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Table 6. Confirmatory factor analysis of original measures. 
 Constructs 
Items ALTRN RSTPW KNACQ 
ALTRN1 0.79   
ALTRN2 0.84   
ALTRN3 0.86   
ALTRN4 0.91   
ALTRN5 0.87   
ALTRN6 0.83   
RSTPW1  0.77  
RSTPW2  0.72  
RSTPW3  0.74  
KNACQ1   0.74 
KNACQ2   0.82 
KNACQ3   0.83 
KNACQ4   0.80 
KNACQ5   0.76 
 Factor correlations 
 ALTRN  RSTPW KNACQ 
ALTRN 1.00   
RSTPW –0.37 1.00  
KNACQ –0.49 0.56 1.00 
Notes: Loadings are completely standardised. All the factor loadings are significant. Goodness of fit indices: Satorra–Bentler 
scaled χ2 = 186.76, df = 74; S – B χ2/df = 2.52; GFI =  0.85; CFI =  0.97; NNFI = 0.96; RMSEA = 0.086; SRMR = 0.067. 
 
Table 7. Confirmatory factor analysis of survey scale. 
Construct Number of 
items 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Construct 
reliability 
AVE Squared factor correlations 
ALTRN RSTPW KNACQ 
ALTRN 6 0.939 0.940 0.724 1.000 – – 
RSTPW 3 0.787 0.788 0.553 0.137 1.000 – 
KNACQ 5 0.890 0.893 0.625 0.240 0.314 1.000 
Notes: n = 206. ALTRN = availability of alternatives, RSTPW = restrained power use, KNACQ = knowledge acquisition. 
Construct reliabilityρc= (Σλ)
2/[(Σλ)2+Σvar(δ)], AVE = Σλ2 /[Σλ2 +Σvar(δ)]. 
 
To demonstrate discriminant validity, Fornell and Larcker (1981) recommended that AVE for 
each construct should exceed the squared factor correlations between that construct and other 
constructs. This was the case (Table 7), thus supporting the discriminant validity of the 
original instrument. 
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Since the data were collected in a single instrument from a single respondent from each 
organisation, the threat of common method bias to the validity of the data was checked using 
Harman’s (1967) one-factor test. The resulting principal component analysis returned six 
distinct factors with eigenvalues greater than 1, which accounted for 70.2% of the variance 
and the first factor accounted for only 28.94% of the variance. The results hence led us to 
conclude that common method bias was not a problem. 
5.3. Hypothesis testing 
A structural equation model of the hypothetical model shown in Figure 1 was constructed to 
test the research hypotheses. The latent variables, ALTRN, RSTPW and KNACQ were 
indicated by the corresponding observed variables. Supply chain performance (SCPFRM) was 
indicated by the single observed variable (SCPERFRM). Again RML was used as the main 
estimation method with sample covariance matrix and the corresponding asymptotic 
covariance matrix employed. The model fit indices demonstrated acceptable model fit to the 
data (S – B χ2/df = 2.71; GFI = 0.84; CFI = 0.96; NNFI = 0.96; RMSEA = 0.091; SRMR = 
0.073). 
 
Figure 2. Path diagram of the fitted structural equation model. 
Figure 2 shows the path diagram of the SEM. As shown in Table 8, the estimated path 
coefficient between availability of alternatives and knowledge acquisition was significant but 
with a negative value of –0.32. Hypothesis 1 was therefore supported. The estimated path 
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coefficient between restraint in the use of power and knowledge acquisition was significant 
with a positive value of 0.46. Therefore, hypothesis 2 was also supported. The estimated 
correlation coefficient between availability of alternatives and restraint in the use of power 
was significant but with a negative value of –0.37. Hypothesis 3 was therefore supported. The 
estimated path coefficient between knowledge acquisition and supply chain performance was 
significant with a positive value of 0.33, thus providing support for hypothesis 4. These 
results are discussed in section 6. 
Table 8. Path coefficient estimates and model fit indices. 
 Latent variables 
 ALTRN RSTPW KNACQ SCPFRM 
Knowledge acquisition –0.32* (–3.40) 0.46* (5.65) – – 
Supply chain performance – – 0.33* (4.22) – 
Availability of alternatives – –0.37* (–3.95) – – 
Restraint in the use of power –0.37* (–3.95) – – – 
Notes: n = 206. *Significant path estimates. 
First value is the standardised parameter estimate; value in parenthesis is the t-value. 
Model fit indices: Satorra–Bentler scaled χ2 = 235.99, df = 87; S – B χ2/df = 2.71; GFI = 0.84; CFI = 0.96; NNFI = 0.96; 
RMSEA = 0.091; SRMR = 0.073. 
 
5.4. Testing the interaction between availability of alternatives and restraint in the use of 
power 
To evaluate the interaction between the two latent variables availability of alternatives and 
restraint in the use of power, the two-step procedure of (Ping, 1995) was followed. Thus the 
latent product was indicated by the product of the sums of the indicators of the two latent 
variables. First, loadings and errors of the latent variables were obtained from the additive 
measurement model (i.e. the measurement model without the latent product). Second, these 
values were used to calculate the loadings and error terms of the latent product, which were 
then used to fix the paths associated with the latent product in the interaction model (Ping, 
1995). Given that the latent variables availability of alternatives and restraint in the use of 
power had good unidimensionality as indicated in the previous CFA analysis, it was 
appropriate to fix the parameter values in the structural model based on the estimates from the 
measurement model (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). 
As shown in Table 9, the resultant interaction model shows good model fit (χ2 = 82.80, df = 
101, χ2/df = 0.82, p = 0.91, CFI = 1.00 and RMSEA < 0.05). Despite the non-significant 
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values, the path estimates specified in the original SEM retained the same signs in the 
interaction model. The interaction variable showed a negative effect on knowledge acquisition 
with a significant value of –0.23. Figure 3 presents the plot of interaction based on the 
standardised path coefficients. It can be seen that when ALTRN is at a lower level (i.e. the 
supply chain partner is more difficult to replace by the responding firm), the restraint in the 
use of power in the partnership has a positive effect on knowledge acquisition. However, 
when ALTRN is at a higher level (i.e. the responding firm has more alternative partner 
choices), the restraint in the use of power in the partnership has a less clear effect on 
knowledge acquisition. 
Table 9. Path coefficient estimates and model fit indices with latent product. 
 Latent variables 
 ALTRN RSTPW ALTRN*RSTPW KNACQ SCPFRM 
Knowledge acquisition –0.06 (–0.41) 0.59 (1.64) –0.23* (–2.22) – – 
Supply chain performance – – – 0.29 (1.57) – 
Availability of alternatives – –0.43 (–1.33) – – – 
Restraint in the use of power –0.43 (–1.33) – – – – 
Notes: n = 206. * Significant path estimates. 
First value is the standardised parameter estimate; value in parenthesis is the t-value. 
Model fit indices: Satorra–Bentler scaled χ2 = 82.80, df = 101; S – B χ2/df = 0.82; GFI = 0.76; CFI = 1.00; NNFI = 1.00; 
RMSEA < 0.05; SRMR = 0.17. 
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Figure 3. Plot of the interaction between availability of alternatives and restraint in the use of 
power. 
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5.5. Controlling for partnership duration 
Previous research suggested that the dynamics of supply chain partnerships may vary 
according to relationship duration (Heide and Miner, 1992; Monczka et al., 1995). We 
therefore examined whether partnership duration will moderate the hypothesised relationships 
specified in the model. To examine the moderation effect of partnership duration, a multiple 
group analysis was conducted. The reported partnership durations were examined first. 
Around half of the sample indicated less than seven years of partnership history (n = 113), the 
other half (approx.) indicating seven years or more (n = 93). The sample was therefore split 
on this basis. 
Before the multigroup structural model was examined, a multigroup CFA was conducted with 
the two samples (Hair et al., 1998). As shown in Table 10, the configural invariance model 
showed good model fit (χ2 = 93.48, df = 148, p = 1.00, CFI = 1.0 and RMSEA < 0.005) 
indicating that the basic factor structure exists in both groups. When equal intercept was 
constrained across groups, the chi-square change was shown to be significant (Δχ2 = 56.13, 
Δdf = 14), indicating that scalar invariance was not supported. However, the non-significant 
chi-square change (Δχ2 = 10.76, Δdf = 14) in the metric invariance model suggested that 
both groups exhibit equivalence in factor loadings, therefore supporting metric invariance, 
and indicating that the multigroup structural model comparison was appropriate to undertake 
(Hair et al., 1998). 
Table 10. Test of invariance of measurement model across groups. 
No. Model χ2 df P-value χ2/df CFI RMSEA 
Nested 
models 
Δχ2 Δdf 
1 Configural invariance 93.48 148 1.00 0.632 1.00 <0.005 – – – 
2 Metric invariance 104.24 162 1.00 0.643 1.00 <0.005 2–1 10.76 14 
3 Scalar invariance 160.37 176 0.79 0.911 1.00 <0.05 3–2 56.13 14 
Note: χ2 is the Satorra–Bentler Scaled chi-square. 
Partnership duration short, n = 113; partnership duration long: n = 93. 
 
First, the SEM specified in Figure 2 was fitted to the short-duration and long-duration 
samples, without any equality constraints, to produce the totally free model. Path estimates 
between latent constructs were then constrained to produce the constrained models (see Table 
11). In model 2 the path estimate between knowledge acquisition and supply chain 
performance was constrained across groups first. The negative chi-square change (Δχ2 = –
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1.33, Δdf = 1) suggests that constraining the path estimate produced better model fit, and the 
partnership duration did not moderate the relationship between knowledge acquisition and 
supply chain performance. 
Table 11. Test of partnership duration as a moderator. 
No. Model χ2 df P-value χ2/df CFI RMSEA 
Nested 
models 
Δχ2 
Δ
df 
1 Unconstrained model 129.07 174 1.00 0.742 1.00 <0.005 – – – 
2 KNACQ  SCPFRM 
equal across groups 
127.74 175 1.00 0.730 1.00 <0.005 2–1 –1.33 1 
3 ALTRN, RSTPW  
KNACQ equal across 
groups 
120.59 176 1.00 0.685 1.00 <0.005 3–1 –8.48 2 
4 ALTRN, RSTPW  
KNACQ and KNACQ  
SCPFRM equal across 
groups 
119.45 177 1.00 0.675 1.00 <0.005 4–2 –8.29 2 
5 ALTRN, RSTPW  
KNACQ and KNACQ  
SCPFRM, and PH equal 
across groups 
112.25 180 1.00 0.624 1.00 <0.005 5–4 –7.20 3 
Note: χ2 is the Satorra–Bentler scaled chi-square. 
Partnership duration short, n = 113; partnership duration long: n = 93. 
 
In model 3, the path estimates between availability of alternatives, restraint in the use of 
power, and knowledge acquisition were constrained. Again the negative chi-square change 
compared with the unconstrained model suggests that partnership duration does not moderate 
the effect of availability of alternatives and restraint in the use of power on knowledge 
acquisition. Model 4 constrained path estimates between availability of alternatives, restraint 
in the use of power, and knowledge acquisition and the path between knowledge acquisition 
and supply chain performance. Again, the non-significant chi-square change suggested there 
is no moderation effect from the partnership duration. Similarly, when covariance between 
exogenous variables (i.e. availability of alternatives and restraint in the use of power) were 
constrained, the chi-square change was not significant, and hence partnership duration did not 
moderate the relationship between availability of alternatives and restraint in the use of power. 
Overall, the multigroup structural model evaluation suggested that partnership duration does 
not moderate the path estimates specified in the full model and that there is no major 
difference across groups of different partnership duration. This finding partly echoes the view 
of Gadde and Snehota (2000), that the relationship between partnership dynamics and 
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partnership duration could be mixed. 
6. Discussion 
Our findings provide support for the original hypotheses. As expected, and in line with 
findings of previous studies (e.g. Wu and Hsu, 2001; Kotabe et al., 2003; Modi and Mabert, 
2007; Lawson et al., 2009), knowledge acquisition activities had a positive impact on the 
performance of supply chain firms. Our study shows that supply chain partners do benefit 
from interfirm knowledge transfer activities. As suggested by Walter et al. (2007) valuable 
knowledge and best practices are often embedded in the supply network. 
The differing effects of the two indicators of power on knowledge acquisition are noteworthy. 
As previously discussed, the literature suggests that availability of alternatives is a good proxy 
measure for actual power. Furthermore, it suggests that the availability of choice results in 
unbalanced power, which in turn can discourage cooperation. Maloni and Benton (2000) 
argued that power can lead to opportunism by partners and subsequently destroy many of the 
relational elements necessary for the development of effective partnerships. The availability 
of alternatives reduces dependence and can create an atmosphere of protecting proprietary 
resources and less willingness to share. In short, the proposition that availability of 
alternatives is likely to hamper cooperative relationships between supply chain partners 
accompanied with lower levels of knowledge exchange has many advocates (Anderson and 
Weitz, 1989; Provan and Skinner, 1989; Maloni and Benton, 2000). In our sample we found 
this to be the case. That is, availability of alternatives had a negative impact on knowledge 
acquisition. Our finding suggests that having alternatives reduces switching costs, making 
investment in long-term relationships comparatively more costly. In these circumstances 
commitment is likely to be lower, which may translate into greater reluctance to enter into 
close knowledge sharing activities. Furthermore, our finding resonates with Petersen et al.’s 
(2008) argument that conversely, high dependency often results in socialisation processes that 
involve knowledge exchange activities to mitigate dependency and generate a greater level of 
relational capital. 
The second factor explaining power was restraint in the use of power and this had a positive 
impact on knowledge acquisition. This finding is in line with the argument proffered by a 
number of scholars, that partners’ willingness to restrain relative power is essential for 
learning and knowledge transfer between supply chain partners (e.g. Buckley et al., 2006; 
Muthusamy et al., 2008). Restraint in the use of power diminishes the reluctance to share 
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knowledge for fear of exploitation (Minbaeva, 2007). The willingness by the stronger partner 
to suppress its excessive power to foster partnership conditions creates a sense of equality 
(Maloni and Benton, 2000) encouraging greater willingness to exchange ideas and knowledge 
(Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000). Managers have greater control over realised power than they do 
on actual power, because actual power is dependent on factors such as size, position in the 
supply chain and firm age. Our findings therefore indicate that the controllable element of 
power, namely a policy of voluntary restraint in the use of power, has a significant influence 
on knowledge transfer and supply chain performance. 
We found that firms with alternatives and whose supply chain partners were therefore easier 
to replace also reported less willingness to exercise restraint in the use of power (as indicated 
by the negative correlation between the two constructs, r = –0.37). This is in line with the 
view that when supply chain actors have alternatives, the more powerful party, being less 
dependent, is more likely to act in its own self-interests, and hence be less likely to restrain its 
use of power. Thus, for example, a focal firm with many suppliers of similar intermediate 
goods is more likely to exercise control (power) by dictating prices or quality levels, and vice 
versa a supplier with many alternative customers is also more likely to choose to dictate 
prices, quality and/or delivery schedule. On the other hand, this negative correlation is also in 
line with the view that restraint in the use of power by a supply chain actor is more likely to 
be observed when that actor has less alternatives available to them, for example when a focal 
firm purchases a high proportion of intermediate goods from a single supplier and has a very 
limited number of alternative suppliers. 
We also found that the acquisition of external knowledge enhances the performance of 
partners operating within a supply chain. This substantiates the previous research of Dyer and 
Nobeoka (2000) that found a positive impact of knowledge acquisition on developing 
performance-improving capabilities, and adds further weight to the utility of investing in the 
development of platforms that support close, timely and effective interaction between supply 
chain partners. 
We found no support for the view that partnership duration moderates the relationship 
between knowledge acquisition and performance. This indicates that immediate gains in 
performance can be realised by those supply chain partners willing to engage in knowledge 
sharing. It also indicates that the investment required before performance improvement from 
knowledge acquisition is realised is unlikely to be prohibitive. 
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The test of interaction between availability of alternatives and restraint in the use of power 
suggests that when a responding firm is highly dependent on its supply chain partner, 
effective knowledge transfer is more reliant on restraint in the use of power by this more 
powerful partner. On the other hand, when the responding firm has greater relative power due 
to having more alternative partners available to it, exercising or not exercising restraint in the 
use of power has little effect on knowledge acquisition. In this case, it may be that there are 
other factors that could affect knowledge transfer; however, identification of such factors was 
not the purpose of this paper. 
7. Conclusions 
The primary contribution of this paper to the literature is to show the differential impact of the 
two indicators of power on knowledge acquisition. Our research thus offers evidence that 
power is multifaceted and that each factor influences knowledge acquisition differently. This 
in turn may explain the inconsistent findings of previous studies examining the role played by 
power within supply chains (e.g. Beecham and Cordey-Hayes, 1998; Cox, 1999; Dyer and 
Nobeoka, 2000; Maloni and Benton, 2000). 
Actual power, in the shape of availability of alternatives, had a negative impact on knowledge 
acquisition. This supports the view that knowledge transfer is more likely to take place when 
one partner views another as irreplaceable. In other words, high interdependence is a catalyst 
for knowledge transfer. More importantly, it is the decision to exercise restraint in the use of 
power that positively influences knowledge acquisition. From a practical point of view this 
study suggests that factors under management control such as how much, and how to exercise, 
power have a significant influence on knowledge transfer and the overall performance of the 
supply chain. A key managerial implication of these findings is that management behaviour 
predicated on exploiting actual power is likely in the long term to be detrimental to improving 
performance. Instead, managers of supply chain actors in favourable positions of power are 
encouraged to see beyond the short-term gains resulting from lower relative switching costs 
and both encourage and lead further development of the cooperative relationship. 
Our study further supports the view that knowledge transfer improves the performance of 
supply chain firms (e.g. Modi and Mabert, 2007; Lawson et al., 2009). This has important 
implications for the design and operation of supply chain partnerships, suggesting that one of 
the main goals ought to be knowledge exchange and ensuring that effective channels are put 
in place to facilitate it. Our finding provides a further reminder to managers that knowledge 
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sharing improves performance and that supply chains offer the potential to affect knowledge 
transfer. A key implication for managers is the need to identify the specific mechanisms, in 
the specific context of their supply chain partnership, that best facilitate closer communication 
and hence knowledge acquisition. Typical mechanisms are visits to partners’ premises, video-
conferencing, and shared web-based communication platforms. A second key implication is 
for managers to think carefully about what type of knowledge is mutually most beneficial in 
the partnership’s specific context, that is to say the content of knowledge transfer. To this end, 
Modi and Mabert (2007) suggest five categories of content: ‘production/manufacturing 
related’, ‘problem solving assistance related’, ‘quality related’, ‘process control related’ and 
‘other’ (e.g. timing and innovation). Perhaps most importantly, there is an important nexus 
between this latter implication and the aforementioned implication for managers to ensuring 
that effective channels for knowledge exchange are developed. There is an opportunity for 
managers to carefully match each of Modi and Mabert’s (2007) categories of ‘content’ of 
knowledge exchange to the existing communication channels and mechanisms in their 
partnership in order to maximise knowledge acquisition. Furthermore, such an exercise can 
identify where gaps exist and channel/mechanism improvement efforts can be prioritised. This 
finding also emphasises the importance both of knowledge being exchanged and of what the 
knowledge is about. Clearly both are important. With this in mind, future research is 
encouraged to examine learning theory (e.g. Huber, 1991; Hult, 1998) with a view to 
extending the knowledge acquisition aspect in supply chain partnership design to cater for 
knowledge geared towards exploration and knowledge geared towards exploitation. 
Top and senior managers represented the majority of respondents in our study as they 
possessed first-hand knowledge of the supply chain practices in their firms. However, our 
study did not explicitly capture at which level or levels in the firms the knowledge acquisition 
was taking place. It would be interesting to see if the relationships we observed in our 
findings hold true at different knowledge exchange levels. For example, it would be 
interesting to ascertain in future research to what extent knowledge acquisition at top 
management versus plant/operations level is affected by the two indicators of power. 
Furthermore, to what extent it is knowledge acquisition at the top management team level that 
helps to drive performance improvement in supply chain firms versus knowledge acquisition 
at lower more operational levels of the firms. Answers to such questions, particularly if linked 
to the ‘content’ and ‘channels’ of knowledge acquisition, would further augment an 
understanding of how supply chain partnerships can best be designed to facilitate performance 
enhancing knowledge exchange 
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Our finding that supply chain actors with many alternative partners are less willing to exercise 
restraint in the use of power, suggests that weaker parties that wish to suppress this tendency 
will have to be even more proactive in their efforts to help the stronger parties appreciate the 
potential gains that could be secured from restraining the exercise of their power. The finding 
suggests that the onus may therefore be with the weaker parties in the partnership to 
champion the cause for greater cooperation and collaboration, and furthermore to identify and 
instigate suitable mechanisms and practices that can facilitate these intentions. This is likely 
to have resource implications for them. 
In summary, our study suggests that it is beneficial for managers in weaker firms to actively 
seek learning partnerships with stronger firms in the supply chain. Furthermore, it is more 
beneficial for managers of firms with superior power to exercise power proportionately and 
constructively and not to overlook the knowledge resident within weaker firms. It can pay 
dividends if boundary spanners give weaker firms greater opportunity to have a say regarding 
cooperation and supply chain operation, hence giving both sides a better chance of improving 
current practices that benefit them as individual firms and benefit the supply chain as a whole. 
This research potentially has two key methodological limitations. First, it may suffer from 
common method bias, which refers to the artificial covariance between the predictor and 
criterion variables when the same respondent is providing the measure for both sets of 
variables (Podsakoff et al., 2003, p. 882). However, by following a tailored design method, 
carefully designing the scale and randomising the items in the questionnaire, the common 
method effects were kept at a minimum level. Moreover, a post-hoc analysis, Harman’s one-
factor test, was performed among all the items, revealing the presence of six distinct factors. 
These results suggested that common method bias was not a likely explanation for the 
reported findings (Andersson and Bateman, 1997). 
Second, this research may also suffer from key informant bias. Although the key informant 
method is widely deemed to be acceptable (Chau and Tam, 1997), the richness of the 
information from only one informant from each firm surveyed is still limited (Tornatzky and 
Klein, 1982). However, since our data were collected from the supply network of one large 
focal firm, it is more likely that the respondents provided more consistent and reliable 
answers, generating a more holistic picture of the supply network studied and reducing the 
negative effect of key informant bias. 
This research has two other limitations, which lead us to suggest important areas for further 
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research. First, in this paper we focused on knowledge acquisition, which is a key part of 
knowledge transfer. However, knowledge transfer also involves internalisation and utilisation. 
The interaction between supply chain partners does not end at the point of knowledge 
acquisition. It is likely that other related knowledge transfer processes, such as knowledge 
internalisation and utilisation may also be affected by power (Makhija and Ganesh, 1997; 
Kim et al., 2004). Therefore, future studies should examine the effect of power on knowledge 
internalisation and utilisation. Second, although the network-based approach we employed 
tends to provide more in-depth understanding and guard against the presence of the 
confounding effects found in the study of unrelated supply chains, the fine-grained approach 
of this study could limit the generalisability of the research results to other industry contexts. 
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